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These mechanisms of coupling and de-
coupling that define the boundaries of 
trust and social affiliation must become 




The paper outlines a perspective on social entrepreneurship that is based on 
a Schumpeterian view of entrepreneurship as the creation of new combina-
tions of resources, and focuses on the nature of actors engaging in the 
pursuit, and the nature of resources mobilized. So as to highlight less famil-
iar aspects of social entrepreneurship, analysis is primarily illustrated by 
applications of a resource-based approach to the study of grassroots enter-
prising in Sweden. The presentation proceeds from rudimentary cases (that 
are organized around a single process of resource conversion) to more 
complex ones. Social entrepreneurship is viewed as a category of entrepre-
neurship that primarily (1) is engaged in by collective actors, and (2) 
involves, in a central role in the undertaking’s resource mix, socially em-
bedded resources. Social entrepreneurship involves the tapping of socially 
embedded resources and their conversion into (market-) convertible re-
sources, and vice-versa. In doing so, it spans the boundaries between 
different property-rights regimes that define resources and their utilization. 
To ensure the undertaking’s (or enterprise’s) survival over time, it would 
also be expected to contribute to the replenishment of such resources, re-
converting market resources into social capital, and reproducing the context 
that makes such transactions possible. 
                                                        
∗   The research on which the study is based is financed by Östersjöstiftelsen, the Baltic Sea Founda-
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Introduction: Reframing social entrepreneurship 
The notion of social entrepreneurship, and the manifest linkage between social entre-
preneurship, social change and economic development attract increasing attention 
from scholars and policy-makers alike. A generally accepted definition of the con-
cept and a conceptual framework in which it could be integrated are, however, still 
lacking. It is possible to distinguish two major approaches in the growing literature 
on social entrepreneurship; both emphasize the social desirability of the initiatives 
studied, though from slightly different angles:  
1.  Focusing on intentions and (successfully achieved) outcomes: “innovative 
efforts to solve persistent social problems of poverty and marginalization 
that, to some extent, have been successful in increasing their impact and 
catalyzing social transformation.” (Alvord et al., 2004:137);  
2.  Focusing on opportunities and needs, in an adaptation of Vyakaraman et 
al.’s (1997) approach to the realities of social enterprising. Social entrepre-
neurs thus are “People who realize where there is an opportunity to satisfy 
some unmet needs that the state welfare system will not or cannot meet and 
who pool the necessary resources (…) and use these to ‘make a difference’”. 
(Thompson et al., 2000). 
Desirability is very much in the eye of the beholder, and thus an ontologically 
problematic criterion. Socially embedded initiatives (whether we consider them en-
trepreneurial or not) may catalyze social change or enhance stability in a given 
society. The change effected, the needs met and/or the status quo preserved may, in 
turn, be judged “desirable” or “undesirable”, by different observers, contingent on 
their attitude (consider the alternative causes of “right to life activism” versus volun-
tary abortion clinics). While the activities of many social entrepreneurs may 
contribute to social policy goals, this is by far not true for all (cf. Baumol, 1990), and 
definitely not all of the time, since both society and social policy change over time. 
Consequently, comparative study of cases of social entrepreneurship in different so-
cietal settings would require a theoretically robust definition that would make it 
possible to approach a broad range of cases of social entrepreneurship quite inde-
pendently of the researcher’s world-view, or of the policies pursued by power-
holders in any given society.  
In keeping with this perspective, the approach outlined in this article proposes a 
focus on the social entrepreneurs’ mode of action, rather than this action’s objective, 
motive or social justification. The pursuit follows Schumpeterian view of entrepre-
neurship, that centers on the creation of new combinations of resources by discrete 
actors (1951). An enterprise is primarily a combination of resources, or, more pre-
cisely, of the “services” (i.e., actual inputs) that can be extracted from those 
resources (Penrose, 1959/1995). Identifying these “extraction” possibilities, and 
(re)combining them in new configurations is the central function of the entrepreneur. 
It is suggested, accordingly, that a search for a definition ought to focus on the con-
stitution of the actors that engage in the pursuit, the nature of resources mobilized,    The Practice of Social Entrepreneurship 197 
 
and the practices pursued over time in extracting them.  
Considered in this fashion, social entrepreneurship is not defined by its “useful-
ness” to others than those who engage in it, nor constrained to any particularly 
“social” form of enterprise (e.g., non profits, charities or social enterprises). Nor is it 
restricted to a narrow range of activity.  
Any undertaking called into being by an act of social entrepreneurship has to meet 
the key requirements of: (1) core task/service provision to target populations; (2) fi-
nancing/resource mobilization over time (sustainablility); indirectly, the second 
requirement presupposes; (3) mustering the support of a community, however defined.  
In handling these issues, entrepreneurship literature tends to be drawn towards the 
spectacular, the successful and the highly visible. As illustrated by the study of Al-
vord et al. (2004), quoted above, this bias for high-profile achievement sways the 
choice of cases studied. Interestingly, high profile applications of social entrepre-
neurship were also documented in the same manner outside the social field proper: 
within grand corporate strategy (Granovetter, 1992) and grand institutional design 
(Djelic, 1998; 2003)
1. Choosing well known evident success stories has strong rhe-
torical merits: lenghty background explanations can be avoided, and the analysis of 
outcomes made simpler. However, well-endowed actors often have, and in fact – 
generally employ – more than one way to achieve their objectives, and (as the case of 
General Electric Corporation, discussed by Granovetter illustrates) the merit of such 
entrepreneurs’ ideas may seldom be neatly separated from the merit of their connec-
tions.  
The obvious conceptual difficulty of analytically separating a social undertaking 
from the context that it is embedded in, is sidestepped here in a quasi-anthropological 
manner, by way of choosing a less familiar context. Rather than exploring the spec-
tacular, the path chosen here is nearly the obverse, namely exploring manifestations 
and problems of entrepreneurship in some of the arenas least commonly associated 
with entrepreneurship, such as public provision of welfare, and focusing on actors 
that normally are found at the receiving end of entrepreneurial initiatives, rather than 
at their creative center: parents, the gravely handicapped, mental patients, the perma-
nently unemployed and the marginalized. Limited economic scope of activity and 
unglamorous fields of operation notwithstanding, cases of cooperative mobilization 
within these groups pose a considerable theoretical challenge. In an important sense, 
such pedestrian endeavors can provide an illustration of entrepreneurship stripped to 
its essentials. Innovation, a central element of entrepreneurship (cf. Schumpeter, 
1951/1989), manifests itself in our case primarily through ingenuous ways of assem-
bling and utilizing available resources to form enterprises, from unlikely elements 
and against all institutional odds. 
The article is organized as follows: (1) some initial considerations that depart 
from a discussion of social capital and its relationship to social enterprising, are pre-
sented in the next section. Practical applications of a resource-based approach to the 
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study of grassroots enterprising in Sweden will be presented subsequently; (2) the 
study object and arena(s) were deliberately chosen so as to highlight aspects of social 
entrepreneurship that otherwise tend to be obscured by high-profile fund raising and 
practices of conspicuous distribution. The presentation proceeds from rudimentary 
cases (that are organized around a single process of resource conversion) to more 
complex ones. The themes highlighted in this section are subsequently integrated into 
a tentative model that re-examines the relationship between social structure, entre-
preneurship and resources, that is presented in the closing section.  
A first look at social entrepreneurship and social capital 
The ability of actors to mobilize resources by virtue of their social affiliations is of-
ten referred to as social capital (Portes, 1998:6). Coleman (1987, 1988) suggested that 
a high level of reciprocal ties between members of a community and the presence of 
social norms facilitate action, and thus are conductive to higher economic achieve-
ment. This generally positive ambience is labeled “social capital” by the author. 
Later work by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) and Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) 
links social capital to individual (and household) achievement but elaborates the con-
cept in divergent directions. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) speak about “a durable 
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition” and the ways in which these are appropriated and drawn upon by indi-
viduals and groups in pursuit of their own ends, while Portes, and Portes and 
Sensenbrenner turn their attention to the social control aspect (through norms and 
configurations of social ties) of social capital, and the mechanisms through which it 
is attained
2. Though Bourdieu emphasizes competition, while Portes, Sensenbrenner 
and Coleman consider social capital to be a public good, all authors focus on its role 
in facilitating individual (or sub-group) achievement, within the context of a given 
community. Simplifying the issue somewhat: while Bourdieu’s question is why some 
individuals in a given community achieve more than others, Coleman, Portes and 
Sensenbrenner aim to provide an explanation to why certain communities appear to 
be more conducive to achievement than others. The possibility of aggregating indi-
vidual achievement into community welfare is indirectly allowed for by both 
Coleman’s and Portes’ approaches, and indirectly hinted at in the illustrations pro-
vided in their articles.  
Putnam’s (1993) seminal work Making Democracy Work played an important role 
in spreading the concept outside strictly academic circles, and into the domain of 
                                                        
2  Portes and Sensenbrenner declare: “We begin by redefining social capital as those expectations for 
action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking of its members, even if these 
expectations are not oriented towards the economic sphere” (1993:1323). This definition differs from 
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policy formation and implementation
3. Putnam’s approach broadly follows Coleman’s 
(rather than Bourdieu’s) but the focus of research is shifted from diffuse “features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms and networks”, to their formal (and, thus more 
readily measurable) manifestations, such as the proliferation of associations and volun-
tary organizations. The level of social capital in a given community is generally seen as 
enhancing economic welfare and civic governance. A claim is made to the effect that 
such findings may be generalizable across entire nations and regions. 
A basic weakness (pointed out, but not resolved by Portes, 1998), that is shared 
by all the approaches discussed above, is the arbitrary fashion in which a “commu-
nity” whose social capital is being mobilized, or the social contexts that provide 
support to – or facilitate social action. While we may accept the fuzziness of 
“neighborhoods”, or even nations, the conceptual difficulty becomes evident in cases 
in which social action precedes, and triggers the emergence of a supporting commu-
nity that, once created, spans or splits previous boundaries or asserts identities that 
previously were denied.  
Quite in keeping with the tendency of treating the “community” as a predefined 
given, that is “mobilized” by the focal actor, most authors portray social capital as 
drawn upon at will from just this context. The focus lies, quite one-sidedly, on the 
way in which social capital facilitates action, and/or paves the way to economic re-
sources, while its reproduction is seen as a (largely unintended) side effect of the 
ensuing economic or social activities (Coleman, 1988). The obverse pattern of pur-
posive formation and maintenance of social links, and the investment of physical 
resources in such a pursuit remain largely unexplored. 
Entrepreneurship evidently spans the conceptual gap between the domain of so-
cial capital, and the domains of economic performance and “conventional” capital. 
The article explores the relevance of this positioning for the practice of social entre-
preneurship, and does not venture to trace or resolve the definition and measurement 
problems that the “social capital” concept gives rise to. I resort to the concept of so-
cial capital, somewhat in Coleman’s (1988) spirit, as a convenient shorthand label for 
the stock of social ties that make up a community, and “an aid towards making the 
micro-to-macro transition without elaborating the social structural details through 
which it occurs” (1988:S101). The focus, however, is on purposeful action, rather 
than on the structure surrounding it. In a reversal of Portes’ and Sensenbrenner´s stated 
goal of exploring “how structure constrains and supports individual goal-seeking be-
havior” (1993:1321), the ambition here is to explore “how agents (individual or 
collective) purposively attempt to generate, and avail themselves of social structural 
features in order to further their own pursuits, and how resources are both mobilized 
and invested in this pursuit”. Different aspects of this practice, set in a somewhat dif-
                                                        
3  For a critique of Putnam’s approach, see Portes (1998). Portes’ criticism is directed to the logical 
structure of Putnam’s analysis. Nonetheless, he concedes (1998:21) that redefining social capital as a 
property of larger aggregations is thinkable in principle. An important dimension of Putnam’s work 
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ferent social context, will be presented in a review of various forms of welfare service 
cooperatives and social enterprises in Sweden in the following section.  
Social enterprising in Sweden: Some examples 
The examples to be discussed below, i.e., Swedish welfare service cooperatives, so-
cial cooperatives, and community development enterprises illustrate practices 
developed by social enterprises in dealing with the Swedish welfare system and local 
society. Though none of the organization forms is unique to Sweden (indeed, some of 
the cases related below were inspired by American or UK examples), their entrepre-
neurial features are set in relief by the Swedish context. The Swedish welfare state’s 
institutional set-up and organizational tradition differ significantly from both the 
American one and from those of most European countries. Consequently, organiza-
tional forms and practices within welfare and social entrepreneurship differ from the 
mainstream, to the extent that claims were raised (e.g., James, 1989; Boli, 1991) that 
“there is no third sector in Sweden”. A detailed discussion of the normative and or-
ganizational underpinnings of the Swedish Model lies beyond the scope of this article 
(see e.g., Stryjan, 2006 and the references there). Some of the model’s central fea-
tures directly impact on our field of study, such as an acknowledged primacy of 
public solutions within the provision of health, education and welfare services, a 
public monopoly over the financing of welfare services, and an ingrained negative 
attitude towards charity (a term that has clearly derisive connotations in Swedish 
usage)
4. The resulting composition of the organizational population, the fields of 
activity chosen, the range of resources available, and the practices developed in Swe-
den can hardly be considered typical or representative of social entrepreneurship at 
large. The prime advantage of this research setting lies precisely in its “otherness”. In 
somewhat of a figure-ground reversal of the field, fund-raising and conspicuous re-
distribution, play a subordinate role in the Swedish case, associations (voluntary and 
for-profit) maintain a higher profile than foundations, mutuality is preferred to char-
ity, and public money is perceived as more legitimate than private donations by the 
organizations concerned and by the broad public alike. Lastly, the (re)allocation of 
resources accomplished by the mechanisms of the welfare state also places the prac-
tice of entrepreneurship within the reach of groups, that would otherwise be found 
most at the demand, rather than on the supply end of social services.  
The cases briefly presented in the sections to follow, illustrate how the key re-
quirements of social entrepreneurship, namely pursuing chosen core activity, 
mobilizing and converting resources, and handling the enterprise’s relationships with 
the community (however defined), may be met and integrated under the institutional 
regime of the Swedish Welfare State. 
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Welfare-service cooperatives, described in the next section, are alternative pro-
viders of mandatory social services (kindergartens and assistance to the gravely 
handicapped, respectively). Both groups, consisting of organizations started by ser-
vice-recipients played an important role in redefining the interface between social 
initiatives and the former public monopoly, and rely on similar public financing 
mechanisms, though their mode of operation, and relations with surrounding society 
are highly different. Social cooperatives are also constituted by their would-be users, 
namely persons excluded from the labor-market, that attempt to create a work-place 
for themselves. However, they operate in a field in which institutionalized public 
financing mechanisms do not exist, while private ones are not socially endorsed. 
Their survival hinges on business revenues, and goodwill from the public sector and 
the surrounding community. Finally, Community enterprises are local development 
associations whose agenda also includes the integration of marginalized groups. CE 
operate in roughly the same field as social cooperatives, but are started by considera-
bly better endowed actors, and can therefore engage in high profile business activity 
and a more active and multifaceted relationship with the local community and with 
the authorities. All descriptions are primarily based on material collected in a number 
of research projects conducted or led by myself
5. Despite local specificities, the proc-
esses discussed are in no way unique to the limited group of cases surveyed. Indeed, 
it can be claimed that they constitute a dimension that is present, to a varying degree, 
in a large portion of entrepreneurial action. 
Welfare cooperatives: The pooling and conversion of entitlements 
Welfare service cooperatives illustrate some of the central features of the Swedish 
welfare state’s institutions, and the way these were taken advantage of by social en-
trepreneurs. The Swedish tradition of solving social problems and answering needs 
through public (rather than private) intervention eventually led to a virtual public 
monopoly over welfare, education, and employment services, safeguarded by regula-
tions that prohibited private financing for those services that are provided by the 
public sector
6, and by norms that strongly inhibit donations to those services that are 
not. This combination effectively hindered the emergence of non-public initiatives 
within health education and welfare until the 1980s. The emergence of parent-
cooperatives played an important role in breaching this trend and in opening the field 
for new social initiatives. The PC basic model is relatively simple, both conceptually 
and resource-wise: parents’ statutory entitlement to day-care for their children (that 
                                                        
5 The  KOPPLA (kooperativ Planering) project (1988-1991); Cooperatives in the Welfare Market 
project (1994-1998); Local Society, Local Government, Local Economy (1998-2004), and the respective 
Sweden studies within the European Thematic networks and projects ESSEN-CGM, EMES ELEXIS and 
PERSE (1994-2004). To minimize tedious self referencing in this text, other authors than myself that 
studied the same, or similar organizations were quoted wherever this was possible. 
6  Fees are customary within most activities (primarily health and day-care), however, those are regu-
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should otherwise be met by municipal units) is converted into a public subsidy for a 
child-care place. A group of parents forms an association that pools these (otherwise 
inconvertible) entitlements, creates the appropriate governance structure, establishes 
a kindergarten for the members’ children, and recruits the professional staff (Pestoff, 
1998; Stryjan and Wijkström, 1996).  
At the core of this arrangement stands, on one hand, the conversion of a statutory 
obligation to provide day-care into a welfare entitlement that is, in turn, convertible 
into funding, and on the other, the welding together of the entitlement holders into a 
functioning social and organizational entity.  
The rule-modification that made such transactions possible was accomplished by 
“wild” initiatives, the first of which started as early as 1974
7. The form’s institutional 
breakthrough came first in 1985. The first parent cooperatives operated in an institu-
tional limbo, surviving through shrewd maneuvering between the national and 
municipal financing systems, significant material concessions
8, advocacy, and sheer 
persistence. Participants’ commitment and the undertakings’ entrepreneurial and 
innovative dimension were crucial in that stage, but gradually waned in pace with the 
organizational population’s rapid expansion throughout the 1980s (to nearly a thou-
sand in 1992
9), and the ensuing institutionalization of the form. Most PCs that are 
active at present could be regarded as small businesses run by collective proprietors, 
rather than as entrepreneurial ventures; activity is highly regulated (strongly limiting 
the ability to diversify the operation into new fields), and the enterprise’s social aspi-
rations are restricted to maintaining and reproducing the parent/member group itself, 
a task that naturally includes recruiting new parents, as children move on to school, 
but also eliciting their considerable outlays in fees, voluntary time and competence.  
The merit of the model lies in its simplicity and replicability. Parent-cooperatives rely 
on a single mechanism of resource-conversion, whereby parents that join the cooperative 
bestow on it entitlements that are disbursed by the public sector. Once this mechanism is 
established, maintaining the group is the one necessary and sufficient condition for con-
tinued financing. Local community support, beyond the highly formalized approval by 
the municipality, is seldom sought, and networking with similar cooperatives is limited.  
Parents’ cooperatives effected a profound change in the public sector’s mode of 
functioning, and opened a new financing channel for social initiatives. The principle 
of  financing by affiliation, also stands at the core of Independent Living Co-
operatives that administer assistance for gravely physically handicapped persons in 
need of around-the-clock assistance. In this case too, welfare entitlements are con-
verted into a source of financing by a group of potential beneficiaries, that pool these 
resources and create an enterprise that supplies the service in question. The nature of 
                                                        
7  With the forming of the parent-cooperative kindergarten “Kossan” (Engström and Engström, 1982). 
8  At the time, municipal kindergartens operated within a double system of municipal funding and state 
subventions that were allocated by the municipality. Parent cooperatives consented in many cases to do 
without any municipal funding. 
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the user/member group, and the organizational solution created to meet the group 
members’ objectives are substantially different from the PC-model.  
STIL (Stockholm Independent Living) was initiated in 1984,
10 by a group of 
gravely handicapped activists from DHR (The National Union of Handicapped Per-
sons). The group championed a consciously militant empowerment strategy, inspired 
by the American Centers for Independent Living (CIL) model and aimed to adapt it 
to Swedish circumstances. To let the gravely handicapped control the assistance that 
they are daily dependent on was seen as a key step in attaining control over own life-
situation. Devising a financing formula to fit Swedish conditions took nearly three 
years, and the cooperative was allowed to start as a one-year project in 1987.
11 Legis-
lation that opened the field for this type of enterprises followed. At present, the 
model works roughly as follows:
12 a prospective member’s entitlement for assistance 
is assessed by the authorities, in terms of assistance hours, that are converted into a 
budget allocation. The cooperative (whose administration is run by the handicapped 
members themselves) opens a member account, and handles the necessary admini-
stration (including employment contracts for assistants, and invoicing the 
authorities). Each member handles his own account, recruits, and coordinates his 
individual group of personal assistants. Public funding may only be used for personal 
assistance and has to be accounted for. The administrative fee levied by the associa-
tion is a business revenue to be used at the members’ discretion. 
Besides improved service, the cooperative effects an important symbolic transfor-
mation of its members, from passive recipients of help to coordinators and 
employers
13. STIL’s employment policy, of employing a large number of unprofes-
sional part-time assistants (rather than a handful of full-time professionals) can be seen 
as part of its members’ quest to avoid binding dependence relations, and to follow their 
own personal inclinations and sustain broader contact networks. This policy places 
extremely high demands both on the individual members (indeed, some of second-
movers into the field adopted less ambitious formulas), and on the association’s admin-
istrative capacity and would have been quite impossible to sustain within a public 
sector organization. The cooperative, that is run by the handicapped themselves pro-
vides the administrative infrastructure that handles personnel administration and budget 
negotiations with the social authorities, training for new members, and propagation of 
the Independent Living concept. In 1996, STIL had 120 members and 600 persons em-
ployed on part-time basis as helpers (Stryjan and Wijkström, 1996). By 2004 the 
numbers rose to 230 members, over 1,000 employees and a turnover of USD 17 million 
(http://www.stil.se).  
                                                        
10  The Stockholm association's formative stages were documented by Gough (1989). I was personally 
involved in a number of seminars with the group in 1984/5 and followed its development throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
11  Jointly financed at that stage by Stockholm Municipality and the Board for Social Affairs. 
12  Based on http://www.stil.se, August 17
th, 2004. 
13  Thanks to the more flexible organization of assistance, some members were, in fact, able to take up 
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Structurally, the STIL organization should be seen as a network organization, in 
which each member constitutes a node, and the network infrastructure and mainte-
nance are indirectly supported by public funds (through an administrative fee on 
members’ accounts, an arrangement quite remindful of consultant agencies). The 
stability of the basic financing arrangement provides the nexus organization with a 
platform for innovative practices, as well as for active and expansive network man-
agement. Finally, through the organization of each member’s circle of assistants, the 
construction of members’ social networks is effectively underwritten by public fund-
ing. Some additional aspects of the organization’s relationship with its environment 
will be discussed later on. 
Social cooperatives: A low-key labor-market integration strategy
14 
Social cooperatives are worker-cooperatives formed by individuals that were classed 
as permanently disabled (physically or mentally) by the social insurance and labor 
market authorities. Prospective founders of such cooperatives are entitled to housing 
and a subsistence pension, but are disqualified from seeking entry into the labor mar-
ket.
15 While the two examples that were discussed in the above sections, dealt with 
(re)organizing delivery of mainstream statutory services by their prospective recipi-
ents, and with the restructuring of recognized entitlements, social cooperatives aspire 
to create a work-place for a group that is statutorily deprived of the right to work (or 
being classified as job-seeker). To circumvent the trap created by regulations, an 
“employer entity” is created by those involved, that offers work (wherever possible, 
through a formal employment contract) to its members. 
The first cooperatives of this type emerged in the late 1980s, as the traditional 
mental institutions were wound down, and were started by discharged former in-
mates. The case of ICS, a social cooperative that operated from 1889 until 2004, 
illustrates some of this organization form’s basic features
16. ICS was founded by a 
group of seven former inmates of the Kristinehamn mental hospital, assisted by two 
ward orderlies that stayed with the group as (non-member) tutors (formally, as “out-
stationed” public employees). The former mental hospital’s carpentry shop became 
the cooperative’s permanent premises. The main business activity, and the enter-
prise’s economic backbone was industrial carpentry.
17 
Similar cooperatives were also started in other fields, by and with groups of men-
                                                        
14  The sections on social cooperatives and community enterprises are largely based on Stryjan 
(2002;2006), and on material collected by the Sweden study of the European project PERSE. Interview 
material, wherever quoted, was collected by E. Laurelii of Kooperativ Konsult, under my supervision. 
15  In Swedish labor authorities parlance, they are not considered as “standing at the labor market’s 
disposal”, and thus are not entitled to apply to the employment agency or for labor-market grants. Taking 
an occasional job may carry a considerable economic penalty. Some of the institutional features of this 
field, and of the organizations themselves, were discussed in Stryjan (2006). 
16  A complete case study is available from the author. 
17  Special packing crates for an engine plant, and partitions and fittings for a camping-trailer producer. 
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tally handicapped, drug addicts and marginalized immigrants. Though the formal 
model closely reminds of “job-creation cooperatves” elsewhere (see, e.g., Hirsch-
man,  1980; Oakeshott 1978; Pattiniämi, 2001), it differs on two counts: (1) the 
presence of tutors, made necessary in most of these cooperatives by limitations on 
members’ capacity;
18 (2) the cooperative is not a “breadwinner-cooperative” in the 
strict sense of the term. Indeed, the direct economic benefit to members from obtain-
ing a formal employment contract is highly limited,
19 and members’ alternative to 
participation is not economic misery but isolation and idleness reasonably well un-
derwritten by social transfer payments. In this respect, they differ substantially from 
South European social enterprises (Defourny and Borzaga, 2001).  
The declared prime objective of ICS was not labor-market rehabilitation (as de-
fined by labor-market authorities) but personal rehabilitation and improving the life-
quality of its members, through the creation of a positive (work) environment. This 
approach stems from a realistic appreciation of the members’ employment prospects, 
a “difficult member-group with grave problems, that are highly unlikely to get a job 
elsewhere”. Work was primarily considered as a means to rehabilitation and a path to 
self-respect. At its height the ambition would be to assist members to advance to a 
status of a formal employee within the cooperative.  
The original founder group consisted of middle-aged ex-patients, and as these 
gradually reached retirement-age or left, new members took their place. The last of 
the founding members (that spent 25 years in a closed ward, and the fifteen that fol-
lowed, as cashier/controller of the cooperative) retired in 2003. All other members 
joined in later stages. All in all, some 70-80 persons were members of the coopera-
tive for some time through the 15 years of its operation.  
At all times, the core group of the association consisted of the working members 
(normally seven to eight). The members constituted the enterprise’s board, and tutors 
attended as non-voting members (an arrangement that is fairly typical for social co-
operatives). At the time of the study (June 2003), only two of eight were formally 
employed, and the remaining six worked voluntarily and depended for their subsis-
tence on social – or health-allowances. Yet, over 20 people could be present and 
working at the cooperative any given day, including people on vocational-training or 
therapeutic occupation directed by the social authorities, and other excluded persons 
from the members’ circle of acquaintances dropping in irregularly.  
It is difficult to present a consistent general model of social cooperatives’ re-
                                                        
18  Typically, a social cooperative would consist of one or two tutors (handledare), supporting 11-12 
users/members; the ratio varies depending on the orientation and the type of activity. In part of the cases, 
the tutors themselves are members elected by their peers, or former recipients of disability pensions. 
19  According to a comprehensive evaluation (Samverkan inom rehabiliteringsområdet, 2000) that 
balances the gains and expenditures for individuals, local government and social care organs in 16 labor-
market integration projects (two of which surveyed in this study), the economic benefits of moving to 
employment are marginal to negative for most categories of the marginalized. Typically, the ICS’ eco-
nomic controller LH chose to remain on disability pension throughout the 15 years of his involvement in 
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source-flows. The basic pattern of individuals coming together and pooling their 
resources, familiar from the previous section is repeated in this case as well. How-
ever, the founders that we deal with in this case are extremely low on personal 
resources and lack social contacts to better-endowed persons. Nor can they draw on 
clear-cut welfare entitlements that may be directly converted and pooled into a stable 
source of baseline funding. Thus, social cooperatives are immediately dependent for 
their day-to day survival on own business revenues and on better-endowed actors in 
their environment. The resources that the participants can pool together and recom-
bine in order to construct their enterprise include their time and effort (which are, in 
a manner of speaking, underwritten by social transfers), and vaguely defined non-
pecuniary welfare entitlements such as a statutory right for “meaningful occupation”, 
whose conversion into enterprise funding is contingent on the municipality’s good-
will. The resource mix is augmented by business revenues and by voluntary inputs 
(often also overtime inputs by committed external tutors), personal contacts and 
rights to use resources held, or financed by, other parties. Most of these resources are 
difficult to capture and define in financial terms, and the resource mixes arrived at by 
various cooperatives vary considerably.  
Definition and comparison of economic performance encounter a number of techni-
cal and conceptual problems : an enterprise may be seen as a nexus of contracts and 
transactions. Transactions that are carried out through this nexus can be said to be “in-
cluded” in the enterprise. Conversely, transactions that bypass it (e.g., providing the 
enterprise with rent-free premises, rather than reimbursing its rental costs) would, ob-
viously, not be included in the enterprise’s balance sheet. Ideally, the contractual 
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Figure 1. The fully-fledged firm 
 
Source: Stryjan (2002) 
 
In reality, however, there is a considerable variation in the way resources coming 
from different sources and earmarked for different ends are handled. Sales revenues 
and material costs are handled in a conventional business manner by all social co-
operatives. But other major components in the enterprise's “resource package” would 
be included in some cases, and omitted in others 
Roughly, it is possible to state that enterprises in the group have two categories of 
invariable production costs to meet: (1) premises (and equipment) that may be rented 
or obtained free of charge; (2) tutors’ wages. In a neat reversal of roles that mirrors 
the Swedish normative makeup, tutors that are considered a part of the productive 
infrastructure, as a rule receive wages. Member-users’ contribution, on the other 
hand, may be (and often is) voluntary (i.e., unpaid).
20 A minimalist firm at the ex-
treme of this continuum, would border on a “collective hobby activity”. 
 
                                                        
20  This is naturally an oversimplification. Tutors' voluntary overtime contribution is often crucial, not 
the least in securing the cooperative’s contacts with the community. Nonetheless, seeming anomalies, 
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Figure 2. The minimalist firm 
 
 
Source: Stryjan (2002) 
 
The extent to which the enterprise can offer regular employment to its members de-
pends on the surplus generated once expenses are met. This continuous hunting and 
gathering process (Stryjan, 1989a) in pursuit for resources, involves exchanges with 
the public sector, and with local society and business partners. The tutors often carry 
an unproportionally large burden in providing the cooperative with a vital contact 
network.  
The authorities. Participation in the enterprise’s invariable costs (premises and 
wages for tutors), whenever secured, may either take the form of a loan “in kind” or a 
contractual obligation. In at least one case, the municipality part-finances tutors’ 
wages, and the remainder is covered from the enterprise’s revenues (i.e., members’ 
partly unpaid work). Agreements as regards purchase of services or granting of sub-
sidies may also be negotiated. Significantly, though many of the social cooperatives 
deliver rehabilitation services and provide occupation places to others than their 
members, this activity is seldom recognized by the authorities as a service that ought 
to be paid for, and thus, a source of revenue for the enterprise. The preference for in-
kind transfers (of personnel and premises, on one hand; of service from the coopera-
tive, on the other) evident in part of the cases, indicates an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the enterprise’s standing as an independent economic subject, rather 
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Local community and business. Available descriptions indicate that social co-
operatives tend to concentrate on services to the local population or to other small 
and medium enterprises in the immediate surroundings. Commercial activity is sel-
dom aimed at large corporations and only to a limited degree towards the public 
sector. Whether deliberately or by default, activities would seem to aim at generating 
a tighter social enmeshment for the cooperative and for its members, such as running 
a workplace canteen, a cafeteria in an industrial park, a day-care dog-kennel, a sec-
ond-hand bookstore, a pet shop, gardening and maintenance in a housing project, etc. 
(Bartilsson et al., 2000). Relations to customers are, in this case, clearly personalized, 
and meant to contribute to create social links between the cooperative and its social 
environment. Inverting the perspective, we may also conclude that the social capital 
generated in these relationships, though primarily meant to improve members’ envi-
ronment, may also be converted into new commercial contracts, or be instrumental in 
the pursuit of (economic) capital.  
It is difficult to determine the extent to which business revenues attest to the en-
terprises’ competitive advantage and marketing skills, or are an expression of 
community support. Keeping in mind the highly reserved attitude to charity in Swed-
ish society, this ambiguity may well be intentional, and deliberately maintained by all 
parts in the relationship, so as to convey the symbolic status of an “ordinary” busi-
ness enterprise on the entire undertaking (Stryjan, 2002). Thus, according to ICS’ 
manager, despite the ostensibly businesslike relation to corporate business partners, 
there was a tacit acceptance from customers that the company cannot handle short 
orders and rapid deliveries, a weakness that would probably have disqualified it in 
most ordinary business dealings.  
Though all social cooperatives do trade some output through market relations, 
their principal output is symbolic in its character (Stryjan and Wijkström, 1996). 
Their chief performance consists of transforming their members, and bestowing on 
them a status that has been denied them by society: that of having a job, an enterprise 
to run, and a community of peers. The tasks of keeping together the group and keep-
ing the enterprise afloat merge in a single core task. In this respect, the enterprise is 
its own central product. 
Community enterprises 
Community enterprises (Sw Gemenskapsföretag; Stryjan and Laurelii, 2002; Stryjan, 
2006) share most of social cooperatives’ goals and values, but integrate these within 
a larger agenda of community development. The Community Enterprise model was 
directly inspired by UK experiences, and is the least specifically Swedish of the or-
ganization forms presented in this article. CEs are generally started by central 
members of the community, and thus with a considerably stronger resource endow-
ment, and generally opt for higher-profile strategies. Such enterprises tend to engage 
to a higher degree in transactions with corporate customers, and often link to (or in-
corporate) key individuals in the community. Environmental linkages would often be 210 Y.  Stryjan 
 
encoded into the enterprise’s board. Most CEs studied have externally recruited 
board members (Levin, 2005) and the association members need not actually work in 
the enterprise. The illustrations in this section are taken from a case-study of Med-
vind, a community enterprise in SE Sweden, that concentrates on integration of 
mentally handicapped. The enterprise, that was started as an offshot of a grassroots 
development project, incorporates local businessmen (of which one is the owner of 
the local restaurant and the coach of the youth ice-hockey team), and the local bank 
director in its governance structure, and is chaired by a senior corporate executive. 
Close relationships in the business arena assist in mobilizing credits and business 
partners. The managing director’s past experience as a municipal officer, local politi-
cian, and officer in the national association for the mentally handicapped, opens a 
variety of channels to public authorities at local and national level and is instrumental 
in negotiating rehabilitation contracts and occupational placements, and projects at 
local and national level. The enterprise’s manager neatly summarizes the approach: 
“Had I not had local support/embeddedness,
21 I would not be able to run any activity 
whatsoever. If I do not have the bank with [behind] me, then I cannot run any project 
here, and so on. Trust is enormously important to cultivate”. Cultivation of trust is an 
ongoing achievement that is attained through a flow of re-iterative exchange transac-
tions, in which the enterprise is not merely a client and a grateful recipient of 
assistance, but an active participant that is called upon to reciprocate and prove his 
suitability and reliability. The public sector is met on several planes: as an authority, 
and as important customer (of rehabilitation services), and sometimes as a partner in 
joint projects. Thus, the different interfaces between community, business and the 
public sector cannot be analytically separated as in the case of social cooperatives. 
Trainee placements are both part of the enterprise’s mission in its own commu-
nity, and a source of up to 25 percent of the enterprise’s revenue, essential for its 
prosperity. Trainees may be directed and financed by any of the authorities within 
health, labor and welfare.
22 Remuneration is negotiated on “pay as you go” case-to-
case basis, or (with the municipality) within a stable contract for four permanent 
places. The relation is perceived as a partnership between equals: “We advanced 
from /being/ a project to /being/ a business”. The emphasis is of independence and 
partnership, rather than on subsidiarity or subservience. “The advantage is that we 
are free: we are not recipients of grants, we supply and sell services”. There is a con-
tinuous, ongoing negotiation about financing levels and financing forms, the 
employment status of participants and their grant-eligibility, and also about issues 
that lie outside the business relation proper, such as (mentally handicapped) partici-
pants, as regards housing and other aspects of the social service they receive. In 
                                                        
21 Förankring, the expression used, literally means “anchoring”, being anchored (from interview tran-
scripts, the PERSE project). 
22  In the complex reality of this sector (see Stryjan, 2003), local government’s various levels (munici-
pality and county, respectively), as well as apex, and local branches of State bureaucracy (the Labour-
Market Board, the Social Insurance Authority) may shift between the roles of partners in a mission, 
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parallel with cultivating business contacts, Medvind also actively seeks – and often 
obtains – financing from the selfsame organs, for development projects and commu-
nity initiatives.  
Medvind consciously profiles itself as a business, and maintains a high visibility 
in the regional chamber of commerce and in local business events. A degree of strain 
exists between the commercially justified ambition to project an image of compe-
tence and dynamism, and the threat this may generate among peers and would-be 
competitors that the enterprise may take undue advantage of subsidies. Active in-
volvement in projects that are oriented to common goals, such as enhancing the 
entire region’s competitiveness is one way of coping with this situation. The coop-
erative is strongly aware of the high impact of networking for all of the commercial 
operations that the enterprise engages in. At the same time, in a rare show of vulner-
ability, that calls to mind the case of ICS in the previous section, Medvind declined to 
pursue an ISO (International Organization for Standardization) quality assurance 
certification, which was judged “too expensive” by the manager and board. That 
large companies are nonetheless willing to contract services from it may attest to the 
goodwill and good standing the enterprise enjoys.  
In keeping with the old adage, the role of close ties, and the trust (and, whenever 
necessary – resources) they generate, is put to visible test in cases of crisis. Medvind 
did, in fact, recently weather a serious crisis: the withdrawal of a major client that 
stood, at the time, for 66 percent of the enterprise’s turnover. Filling-in the economic 
gap this created was largely made possible thanks to contacts in the local business 
community that made quick recruitment of new customers possible, to social authori-
ties’ continued supportive attitude (and a slight increase in the volume of service 
purchases, that improved the cash flow), and to the bank’s patient attitude (the enter-
prise was heavily in debt at that moment, due to a real-estate purchase). The 
considerable sangue froid demonstrated by Medvind’s customers, creditors and busi-
ness partners was proven as justified in the long run.  
Overview of the presented enterprises  
Each of the enterprise types reviewed under the Swedish examples was started and is 
run by a group that is held together by a common need/life situation and a shared 
idea of how this need should be met or resolved. The activities initiated are self-
centered, in the sense that their initiators either are identical with, or included in the 
target population. The four enterprise types are summarized in Table 1. 
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The resource mix mobilized by the four enterprise types varies considerably. This 
difference can be traced back to differences in the rule regimes that govern their re-
spective fields of operation, but also to the involved persons endowments and life 
situation.  
All enterprises reviewed in this paper are organized along cooperative principles. 
This choice, though strongly swayed by the Swedish organizational tradition, also 
reflects the enterprises’ economic rationale that involves the pooling of resources that 
members can access and apply to a collective pursuit of common goals. These prop-
erty-rights and collective action aspects of social entrepreneurship will be discussed 
in the two opening sections of the discussion.  
Discussion 
Embeddedness revisited: institutions, resources and the social context 
Resource-wise, the entrepreneur’s field of action is defined by existing societal dis-
tributions of entitlements (cf. Sen, 1981), and the available (in the sense of not being 
barred by accepted norms) modes of extraction in a given society. Understanding 
these rules and procedures is pivotal for understanding the practices resorted to by    The Practice of Social Entrepreneurship 213 
 
social entrepreneurs in handling socially embedded resources. While the concept of 
embedded transactions is fairly accepted, the notion of resources being embedded is 
less self-evident, and may merit some discussion. Whether a resource that an indi-
vidual is entitled to is alienable (i.e., may be freely contributed or traded by their 
holder) or not, and what conversion rules or limitations apply, would vary from one 
social context to another. The complex, ambiguous and culture-dependent character 
of such property rights and rule regimes is put in relief at the interface between social 
entrepreneurship and business activity. Quite obviously, some assets held individu-
ally may not be transferred. Others may be transferred by way of gift, but not 
sold/exchanged (cf. Titmuss, 1977; Geertz, 1973); the circle of potential transaction 
parts it may be transferred to, may be open or restricted, etc. Just as “ownership” 
over a resource is not necessarily tantamount to control over it (Stryjan, 1989b), the 
right to allocate resources is not invariably linked to the right to use or appropriate 
them (decision-makers in modern societies, welfare officials, senior corporate execu-
tives and officers in cooperatives and non-profits are all a case in point). Conversely, 
the right to use an asset may or may not be transferable, etc. 
This complexity contrasts with the dominant market model, within which re-
sources are normatively expected to be fully separable from their “owner” if he so 
desires. Strings tied onto the free movement of assets so as to make them less alien-
able are perceived as market imperfections. Polanyi (1944/2001) suggested that 
mobility/alienability on one hand, and the restrictions on it on the other, represent, in 
fact, separate normative orders. Commodification, through which social ties and 
“traditional” forms of property rights are displaced by impersonal market rules re-
flects a process in which an economic market order is achieving domination over the 
social order. De Soto’s (2001) approach to the property rights of those marginalized 
by the victorious market order presents the problem in nearly similar terms. Yet, the 
solution proposed is somewhat of a conceptual mirror–image of Polanyi’s. According 
to de Soto, the rise of market institutions “declassifies” traditional resources that are 
held “informally”, and excludes societies and groups that hold them from the realm 
of market transactions, and the affluence it generates, confining them to the informal 
economy. Inasmuch as disenfranchisement was caused by exclusion from the market, 
the path to empowerment leads through the market, by way of an institutional re-
classification of held assets.  
Non-market property regimes need, however, not be “traditional”, as in the cases 
discussed by de Soto. A comprehensive set of “non-market” property-rights and enti-
tlement packages is defined, in advanced welfare societies, by the institutions of the 
welfare state. The rules that regulate transfer and (eventual) exchange in this case 
differ from those that would apply either to the economy or to civil society. As dis-
cussed in the section on social enterprises, welfare entitlements are economic by their 
nature (immediately, as in the case of transfer payments, or indirectly, when dis-
bursed as transfer services), and social in their content. The drive to convert them 
into economic resources, that was discussed in the cases of previous sections of this 
paper may, in fact, be considered as an application of de Soto’s reasoning to the wel-214 Y.  Stryjan 
 
fare and labor spheres.  
Common to the spheres of reciprocity and social relations and of wel-
fare/statutory redistribution, is the fact that assets are wholly or partly withheld from 
the market exchange mechanism and linked to physical persons, instead of being 
freely alienable. As a matter of common sense, the most feasible way of accessing 
resources that are embedded in such fashion in social or institutional systems is 
through directly linking to these individuals that can access them. Simply put, wher-
ever individuals and resources are bound together by formal or informal rules, the 
formation of an enterprise requires assembling together actual human beings, and not 
merely accumulation of impersonal physical (or financial) resources. 
Actors and resources: A community of action 
Cooperative enterprise, the incorporation form resorted to in all the cases studied in 
this article, is the traditional mode of linking individually held non-market resources. 
Historically, it was employed in integrating unlikely (and, at the time, seemingly 
non-marketable) resources into unified economic instruments: the purchasing power 
of the poor, the credit-worthiness of smallholders (cf. Bonus and Schmidt, 1990; 
Yunus and Jolis, 2003; Bernasek and Stanfield, 1997), or the labor of the unemploy-
able (Hirschman, 1980).
23 Indeed, it is the act of pooling that renders such resources 
marketable, and provides a potential platform for entrepreneurial action. Though 
collective entrepreneurial action needs not confine itself to institutionalized channels 
(cf Hirschman, 1981,1984; Tetzschner, 1998), or specialized incorporation forms 
(Reich, 1987; Vyakarnam et al., 1997), cooperative governance structures are de-
signed to fulfill the twin tasks of safeguarding the resource-holders rights and of 
facilitating joint action to advance their interests (Stryjan, 1994, 1989b). 
Entrepreneurial features are most manifest in a cooperative enterprise’s founding 
years, during which a common unit is forged, individuals motivated/mobilized to join 
it, and institutions are shaped. Studying new cooperatives’ founding years (Stryjan, 
1994a), we find that the crystallization of a core group, that progressively links in 
additional participants, resources and fields of activity often proceeds in a non-linear, 
open fashion, seizing opportunities, as these present themselves. Prospective mem-
bers’ relation to their organization, and the possibilities open for collective action in 
the four enterprise types are presented in Table 2. 
 
                                                        
23  Cooperatives may also exploit in a likewise fashion traditional, indivisible collective rights (e.g., of 
aborigine groups), in cases in which belonging to a collective entitles the individual to a right of use 
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All organizations reviewed are created by volition (though social cooperatives’ mem-
bers lack other realistic alternatives), and have shared perceptions of the enterprise’s 
goal and activity. However, members’ circumstances, and the available options and 
motivations for entrepreneurial action differ considerably. Parent cooperatives prime 
objective is to provide a stable environment for members’ children, while IL-
cooperatives are created to promote members’ individual development. Enterprise de-
velopment is accorded a low priority on the organizations’ and their members’ agenda, 
and entrepreneurial action would be resorted to in managing crises and introducing 
improvements. By comparison, both social cooperatives and community enterprises are 
naturally oriented towards collective action. Both are conceived as open-ended pro-
jects, and both are committed to the advancement of their target community, though the 
perceptions of community and the orientation towards growth may differ somewhat, 
between, as well as within the two groups. The capacity for concerted collective action 
presupposes a shared conception of “actorhood”, and of the joint undertaking’s intrin-
sic worth. To the extent members are expected to commit personally linked resources 
(including intangible ones, as contacts and reputation) to the joint activity, transactions 
would follow and be keyed to uphold two basic assumptions, namely of reciprocity and 
of permanence (Stryjan, 1989b). As demonstrated by Uzzi (1997), the last of these is 
both the most tangible and the most obviously counter-factual of the three. Cultivating 
a community closely reminds of planting the proverbial oak-tree: an endeavor whose 
future life span is quite uncoupled from that of any occasional participant’s.  
In parallel with forming the enterprise proper, the founder(s) often invest in as-
sembling a network of supporting individuals and organizations in the enterprise’s 
environment, that are essential to the enterprise’s resource procurement. The bounda-
ries between these “outreaches” of the enterprise and the focal organization proper 
are often held vague, and intentionally so.  216 Y.  Stryjan 
 
Converting capital: Social entrepreneurship and social capital revisited 
“Social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of member-
ship in social networks or other social structures” (Portes, 1998:6). So perceived, 
social capital may be seen as a tapestry of potential access paths, to be used by pro-
spective organization-builders. The ties that link individuals do, at least potentially, 
also link the resources that those individuals can access, mobilize (through his/her 
contacts) or allocate (through his/her position in other organizations/enterprises). 
Social entrepreneurship is thus largely a matter of connecting such nodes into net-
works so as to provide the desired resource-mix (cf. Penrose, 1959/1995) thus, 
effectively converting social capital into economic resources, and a set of nodes into 
an enterprise in spe. Rules of generalized equity apply in such constellations, in the 
sense that members/participants in a supporting network expect that their contribu-
tions will be reciprocated in the long run, though not necessarily in the same 
currency. As different parts/nodes of an enterprise’s support network may be located 
in different property-rights regimes, the nature of contributions and of reciprocation 
would vary, depending on the context and the giver/receiver. Ties, obligations, and 
exchanges are thus not exclusively bound to a single “social only” or “economy 
only” sphere. On the contrary, material resources would often be reciprocated for by 
symbolic or social ones, and vice versa. The main types of such transactions will be 
reviewed below.  
Contributions (exchanges from social to economic capital). Social entrepreneurs 
traditionally utilized social capital to obtain resources. Credit cooperatives and asso-
ciations are the best known “classical” form of direct conversion of individual 
pledges into (access to-) capital (Bonus and Schmidt 1990). Welfare cooperatives, 
discussed above convert, in a similar manner, social capital into affiliation and the 
pooled welfare entitlements gained in this fashion, into public financing. Otherwise, 
the simplest traditional form of nearly linear conversion is that of voluntary labor 
(see Quarter et al., 2003). Using pledges of voluntary labor as pro-forma matching 
financing for the purpose of EU-projects illustrates how institutional measures can 
provide new economic leverage to informal arrangements. A wide range of other 
strategies is cultivated by social entrepreneurs. The full range of procurement and 
contribution strategies forms a complex and highly heterogenous mix: donations in 
kind within the “gift economy” circuit (such as help with equipment repairs, the rent 
free use of premises, or the loan of a tool) intertwine with highly sophisticated sym-
bolic contributions, such as recommending an enterprise to another prospective 
customer, a positive credit assessment or (in the case of authorities) a liberal attitude 
in applying existing regulations and eligibility requirements. “Good standing” would 
carry economic benefits also in institutionalized welfare settings, in which the han-
dling of applications for project grants, the interpretation of entitlements, and the 
allocation of contracts are often swayed by an official’s perception of the applicant’s 
good faith and his reliability. Important favors may be extended also by default (as 
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director, to let confidence win over prudence, and neither terminate Medvind’s 
credit-line once its order-book problems became known, nor move in to foreclose on 
the enterprise’s considerable mortgage, is a prime example of such restraint. In acting 
in this fashion, the director willingly exposed himself and the bank to risk, in a man-
ner that can hardly be fully understood in pure business terms. His (in)action, in turn, 
put an obligation on the enterprise’s management to refrain from filling in for a bank-
ruptcy and to do its outmost in effecting a turnaround. This, in turn, enhanced the 
trust relationships that the enterprise evidently managed to build up and the efficacy 
of its social strategy. 
Reproduction (from social capital to social capital). The cases discussed above 
illustrate a consistent strategy of construction of supporting networks in the relevant 
environment, and their continued maintenance/reproduction. Nourishing a supportive 
relationship is to an extent a matter of continuously promoting the intrinsic worth of 
the joint enterprise’s operation (cf Stryjan, 1989b), but such relations are a matter of 
reciprocity and utility as well, and as such reinforced by deed, not by word alone. To 
put it bluntly, in order to enjoy continuing support, the social entrepreneur has to 
repeatedly prove the enterprise’s actual or potential usefulness to partners and mem-
bers. Such exchanges are self evident in customer and partner relations with 
households and local business, but also in the structurally simple cases of welfare 
cooperatives, such as parents’ cooperative kindergartens. In all these, a viable exit 
option exists, and may be utilized by those dissatisfied. In formal settings, public or 
corporate, in which all parts are sensitive to allegations of favoritism, exchanges may 
be highly intricate and implicit. Some may involve contribution to a partner’s stand-
ing in other networks that he participates in. Community enterprises such as 
Medvind, may provide additional indirect benefits to their partners, through the ex-
tensive contact network that they maintain. To an extent, the enterprise reciprocates 
for the trust bestowed upon by facilitating contacts between partners and backers 
(that constitute nodes in its network) and making its own network accessible for the 
launching of new initiatives by other network members (see Badelt, 2003:149). This 
facility becomes particularly valuable in partner-quests in the emerging context of 
EU-projects and partnerships. 
Facilitating contacts between actors around the enterprise increases network clo-
sure, which in itself contributes to the generation of social capital (Portes, 1998). 
Closure in itself may however be a source both of strength and of weakness (cf. Burt, 
2001) depending on the range that is encompassed. For social cooperatives, whose 
members’ range of external contacts is highly limited, closure at the enterprise level 
contributes to internal strength and a highly succesful therapeutic environment for 
their members, but it places the enterprise at disadvantage where the procurement of 
resources is concerned. Obviously, the challenge for each enterprise is to define and 
maintain the appropriate scope and level of closure.  
Investment/reconversion (from economic to social capital). Donations and spon-
soring are the traditional clear-cut examples of exchange situations in which 
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ing on the norms that apply in a given society, and the parts’ respective standing, 
such transactions may be initiated by either part in the exchange and would enhance 
the standing of either of these, or both. For social enterprises that would normally 
stand at the recipient end of the gift relationship, promotion and fund-raising, rather 
than donations, are likely principal modes of investment (in the Swedish context, 
public financing conveys more legitimation than donations; consequently, promotion 
would normally be preferred to fund-raising). This is, however, only a part of the 
picture just as in the case of conversion; important reconversion decisions are often 
taken by default, most typically by declining to pursue an opportunistic course of 
action. The opportunity cost incurred when an enterprise chooses to follow the norms 
endorsed by its supporting network, instead of opting for swift returns, is in fact an 
investment. Viewed in this light, Coleman’s contention that social capital is created 
“mainly as a by-product of other activities” (1988:S118) seems quite inappropriate. 
Indeed, entrepreneurs that are dependent on goodwill for their operation can be ex-
pected to consciously invest in nurturing the relationships that provide it, both by 
deed and by default.  
Business venture. The reproduction of economic capital is sufficiently described 
in mainstream economic literature, and will thus be only named here briefly. Eco-
nomic activity can be, and at times is pursued, in utter disregard of the surrounding 
society. Yet, it is socially embedded to some extent in most cases. Conversely, social 
undertakings would normally include an economic component, and their survival 
would generally hinge on meeting some sort of economic boundary conditions.  
Conceptually, the four elements outlined above add up to a reproduction circuit 
that encompasses both economic and social relations in an ongoing reiterative proc-
ess, in which the reproduction of social capital is closely linked to that of economic 
capital, and vice-versa. Some of the typical modes of conversion and reproduction 
are schematically charted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Modes of conversion and reproduction 
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Each of the four elements can be practiced and observed largely independently of the 
others, either in isolation, or within a subset of the four
24. Optimally, we should ex-
pect these elements to be congruent with, or contentwise supportive of each other. 
The enterprise’s economic performance and the nature of its business activity should 
enhance its good standing and be partly directed towards reproducing its support 
base. The conversion practices engaged in to mobilize support should be congruent 
with its values and goals, and conducive to its business performance, etc. To attain 
                                                        
24  Both cases of pure economic reproduction and pure social reproduction are intuitively familiar. The 
potlatch ceremony is an unsurpassed example of a one-way, one time reinvestment; likewise, extreme 
cases of one-way conversion of social capital to economic capital may be observed in plain confidence 
tricks and (with some reservations, since opportunistic actors may seek a way to reiterate their gains) 
“opportunistic behavior” as well. 220 Y.  Stryjan 
 
such congruity, the four fields of activity (or their respective target groups) should be 
embedded in, or linked by a common social context. While it is possible to envisage 
situations (as in the cases of classical philantropy or classical exploitation) in which 
the target-population of a service and the sources of financing are fully separated 
from each other, these should rather be considered cases of windfall financing that 
remain viable as long as the benefactor’s motivation lasts. 
Thus, social entrepreneurs identify and define a community, rather than merely 
contribute to a predefined one. The model outlined here goes well beyond the two 
simplistic assertions that social capital is mainly a by-product of other activities 
(Coleman,  1988), and that “social enterprises produce social capital” (Ev-
ans/Conscise,  2003). The boundaries of such provisional communities need not 
follow historically, geographically or politically predefined (e.g., local, national, 
regional) “communities”. Only one of the cases discussed in this article, Medvind and 
its supporting network purposefully aspires to identify with, address (and to a degree, 
encompass) its entire local community. Even in this case, the boundaries are left in-
tentionally vague, and advocacy shifts focus between home locality, the municipality 
(that is an amalgamation of small towns, with its centre elsewhere) and the broader 
region of Scania.  
The links constructed by other enterprises in our sample address, define, and bind 
together a subset within a community (however defined). Both parent-cooperative 
kindergartens and social cooperatives act, in a highly circumscribed social space, and 
focus primarily on their respective circle of members/users, though they do so for 
diametrically different reasons. The first, due to lack of interest, and the fact that 
other alternatives are available to their members. The second, owing to their mem-
bers’ limited resources, and the higher urgency of these members’ needs. Simply put, 
for members of a social cooperative, the enterprise often is the only community they 
have. Social cooperatives’ conscious policy of engaging in services to members of 
the local community could be seen as an effort to break this circle of isolation, and 
become part of a broader context. Finally, STIL engages in single-minded pursuit of 
empowerment for its members, and consciously limits its social scope, while extend-
ing the geographical one. Socially, the cooperative fosters contacts between 
members, and support them in constructing their personal networks of assistants, 
while cross-contacts between those subsidiary networks are not encouraged;
25 geo-
graphically, it prefers to operate nationally, rather than locally and strives to create a 
decisional community of the like-minded wherever in Sweden these may be located.  
The scope and structure of the provisional community that links primary us-
ers/members and prospective partners follow from – and directly affect – the 
enterprise’s strategy and mode of operation. The task of defining, crafting and main-
taining/modifying this community musters the “mechanisms of coupling and 
decoupling that define the boundaries of trust and social affiliation” (Granovetter, 
1992), that lie at the core of social entrepreneurship. Whether the goals and values 
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championed and the boundaries of affiliation thus (re)drawn contribute to those en-
dorsed by society at large, is a matter to be resolved by policy-makers and 
administrators, rather than by entrepreneurship theory. 
Final comments 
Social entrepreneurship involves the procurement and handling of socially-embedded 
resources, devising ways of deriving services from these, and assuring the undertak-
ing’s sustainability over time. Thus, the practices described and discussed in this 
article are in no way unique to Sweden, to the limited group of cases surveyed, or to 
the field of social policy. Indeed, it can be claimed that they constitute a dimension 
that is present, to a varying degree in entrepreneurial action. Similar practices can 
also be identified in the operations of partnerships, networks and industrial districts, 
whose prominence in both economic and social policy is clearly on the increase, not 
the least due to the spread of novel accounting and financing instruments developed 
within the expanding sphere of European Union institutions. The core activities of 
social entrepreneurship, the mobilization of contributions, and the task of aligning 
different contributors into viable partnerships thus become easier to account for, and, 
hopefully, easier to pursue as well. 
An approach that strives to present the practice of social entrepreneurship in eco-
nomic terms, with a focus on resource mobilization rather than on their utilization 
increases the practice’s relevance to the understanding of “mainstream” entrepre-
neurship. It may also prove to be the best way to counter attempts to reduce the field 
of social policy to matters of re-distribution or social engineering. 
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